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Abstract—In this paper, we consider a class of denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks, which aims at overloading the com-
munication channel. On top of the security issue, continuous
or periodic transmission of information within feedback loop
is necessary for the effective control and stabilization of the
system. In addition, uncertainty—originating from variation of
parameters or unmodeled system dynamics—plays a key role
in the system’s stability. To address these three critical factors,
we solve the joint control and security problem for an uncertain
discrete-time Networked Control System (NCS) subject to lim-
ited availability of the shared communication channel. An event-
triggered-based control and communication strategy is adopted
to reduce bandwidth consumption. To tackle the uncertainty in
the system dynamics, a robust control law is derived using an
optimal control approach based on a virtual nominal dynamics
associated with a quadratic cost-functional. The conditions for
closed-loop stability and aperiodic transmission rule of feedback
information are derived using the discrete-time Input-to-State
Stability theory. We show that the proposed control approach
withstands a general class of DoS attacks, and the stability
analysis rests upon the characteristics of the attack signal. The
results are illustrated and validated numerically with a classical
NCS batch reactor system.
I. INTRODUCTION
The range of applications of Cyber-Physical Systems
(CPSs)—e.g. power systems, intelligent vehicles, civil infras-
tructure, aerospace, retail supply chains, connected medical
devices—has vastly expanded beyond the realm of large-
scale public infrastructures. The presence of a communi-
cation medium combined with a tight integration of var-
ious subsystems make most of these applications safety-
critical. Therefore, both CPSs and Networked Control Sys-
tems (NCSs) are broadly exposed to cyber-threats and cyber-
vulnerabilities which may affect the functionality of physical
processes at their core. These critical issues have spurred
new lines of research at the interface between cyber-security
and control theory [1], [2]. For instance, the effects and
containment of cyber-attacks on control systems, which
affect the availability and integrity of sensor and actuator
information have been studied in [3], [4]. Recently, Teixira et.
al. [4] described different characteristics of cyber-attacks and
defined an attack space to analyze the effect of cyber-attacks
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on closed-loop dynamics. Cyber-attacks can be broadly clas-
sified into two categories: Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks
and deception attacks [5]. This paper is concerned with
DoS attacks and their effects on dynamical systems. DoS
attacks primarily affect the transmission medium within the
feedback loop and cause irregular exchanges and losses of
information [6], [7]. As this is one of the most reachable
attack patterns in the attack space, many researchers have
studied its effects both theoretically and experimentally [8]–
[11].
Beyond inherent security issues present in NCSs, the
exchange of feedback information over the shared commu-
nication channel, be it continuous or periodic, consumes a
significant portion of the available bandwidth. Recently, it
has been shown that significant savings in the bandwidth and
communication resources can be achieved by switching from
periodic or continuous sampling to aperiodic sampling [12],
[13]. Specifically, event-triggered control strategies have re-
vealed drastic reductions in the use of network bandwidth
within the feedback loop [14]–[18]. A central problem with
classical event-triggered control is the need to have an accu-
rate model of the system in order to devise appropriate event-
triggering rules. In practice, system modeling inevitably sim-
plifies the actual system’s operations, and thereby introduces
a certain level of inaccuracy. Recently, Tripathy et al. [17]
have developed a robust event-triggered control algorithm
based on aperiodic feedback so as to deal with the presence
of uncertainty.
It is worth highlighting that there is a vast breadth of
problems related to the issue of event-triggering control in
the presence of DoS attacks, and with model uncertainty
in NCSs. In event-triggered control, any new information
is exchanged only when the stability criterion is violated,
which implicitly assumes that the communication channel
is available at the time of event generation. It is clear
that any factor or event affecting the availability of the
interconnecting network, such as a DoS attack for instance,
has the potential to seriously hinder the underlying physical
processes and overall operations of the NCS. In light of this,
it appears timely to develop new event-triggering control
strategies capable of ensuring the stability of the closed
loop system subjected to DoS attacks characterized by their
frequency and duration, while accounting for uncertainty of
the NCS model.
In this paper, we propose an attack-resilient event-based
robust control algorithm for discrete-time uncertain systems.
Norm-bounded mismatched uncertainty is considered for the
derivation of the robust control results. The primary goal of
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this work is to analyze the effect of DoS attacks on a discrete-
time uncertain network controlled system, and to characterize
the relationship between frequency and duration of the attack
signal and closed-loop stability. The Input-to-State Stability
(ISS) theory is applied to derive the transmission rule and
on/off periods of DoS attack signal. The key contributions
of this paper are listed below:
•We derive and propose a resilient event-based robust con-
trol law, within the optimal control framework, that is
capable of dealing with both the occurrence of repeated
DoS attacks and model uncertainty.
•We establish the upper bound of acceptable duration and
frequency of DoS attacks, for which the ISS stability of the
uncertain discrete-time systems is guaranteed with event-
triggered feedback.
•The numerical results obtained with a NCS model for a
batch reactor system provide an illustration of the proposed
approach and also validate its effectiveness.
Notations and Definitions: The Euclidean norm of a vector
x ∈ Rn is denoted by ‖x‖. The symbols I denote the
identity matrix of appropriate dimension. The maximum
(resp. minimum) eigenvalue of a symmetric matrix P ∈
Rn×n is λmax(P ) (resp. λmin(P )). A continuous function
f : R≥0 → R≥0 is said to be class K∞ if it is strictly
increasing, f(0) = 0 and f(s) → ∞ as s → ∞. A
function f : R≥0 → R≥0 is a class K function, if it is
continuous, strictly increasing and f(0) = 0. A continuous
function β(r, s) : R≥0 × R≥0 → R≥0 is a KL function,
if it is a class K function with respect to r for a fixed s,
and it is strictly decreasing with respect to s when r is
fixed [19]. For any given time interval [0, k) where k > 1,
Toff(k) denotes the total duration of DoS attack over [0, k).
The ratio Toff (k)k represents the rate of unavailability of
the communication channel following the DoS attack. The
variable Noff(k) represents the frequency of DoS attack in
the time interval [0, k) i.e. it means that Noff(k) off-to-
on transitions are present in the attack signal during which
communication is impossible. The definitions detailed below
are used to establish the theoretical results.
Definition 1 (Input-to-State Stability [19]):
A discrete-time system
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k), (1)
is globally input-to-state stable (ISS) if it satisfies
‖x(k)‖ ≤ β(‖x(0)‖, k) + γ (‖u(k)‖) , (2)
for all admissible inputs u(k) and for all initial values x(0),
with β a KL function, and γ a K∞ one.
Definition 2 (ISS Lyapunov Function [19]):
Assume system (1) is at steady state at the origin, that is
f(0, 0) = 0, ∀ k > 0. A positive function V (x(k)) : Rn → R
is an Input-to-State Lyapunov function for (1) if there exists
class K∞ functions α1, α2, α3 and a class K function γ for
all x ∈ Rn and u ∈ Rm satisfying the following conditions
α1(‖x(k)‖) ≤ V (x(k)) ≤ α2(‖x(k)‖), (3)
V (k + 1)− V (k) ≤ −α3(‖x(k)‖) + γ(‖u(k)‖). (4)
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of proposed control technique under DoS attack
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Problem description
Consider a linear event-triggered system with model un-
certainty mathematically represented by
x(k + 1) =
(
A+ ∆A(p)
)
x(k) +Bu(ki),
∀ k ∈ [ki, ki+1), i ∈ N, (5)
u(ki) =Kx(ki) = K{x(k) + e(k)}, (6)
where x(k) ∈ Rn and u(ki) ∈ Rm are the system state
and input vectors, respectively. The symbol ki in (5) and (6)
represents the i-th aperiodic sensing and actuation instant
and e(k) = x(ki) − x(k),∀k ∈ [ki, ki+1). The unknown
matrix ∆A(p) ∈ Rn×n represents the uncertainty due to
the bounded variations of the system’s parameter p and its
effects on the nominal system matrix A. The variations
of p are bounded by a known and possibly uncountable
set Ω. In general, the uncertainty is either matched or
mismatched [21]. For matched system, the uncertainty affects
the system’s dynamics via the input matrix, i.e. ∆A(p) is in
the range space of matrix B. This assumption does not hold
for mismatched systems. In this paper, the unknown matrix
∆A(p) is mismatched in nature and it is expressed as
∆A(p) = BB+∆A(p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
matched
+ (I −BB+)∆A(p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
mismatched
. (7)
The matrix B+ represents the left-pseudo inverse of input
matrix B, i.e. B+ = (BTB)−1BT . The unknown state
perturbation matrix ∆A(p) is bounded by a known matrix
F which is defined as
∆A(p)T∆A(p) ≤ F
2
, (8)
where the scalar  is a design parameter. The block diagram
of the proposed controlled system is shown in Fig. 1.
According to (5), the control and sensing actions are executed
at each event-triggering instant ki. However, when DoS
interruptions affect the communication medium, the control
and sensing actions are prevented from being executed. For
simplicity, in this paper we assume that DoS attack equally
affects the control and measurement channels. As expected,
in the presence of DoS attacks, the data cannot be transmitted
to or received from the communication channel.
Problem Statement: Design robust event-triggered state
feedback control law (6) that stabilizes system (5) in the
presence of DoS attacks and mismatched uncertainty (7).
Proposed Solution: A two-step solution to this control
problem is proposed. First, a robust controller is designed to
handle uncertainty and then, a transmission rule for sensing
and actuation is derived to tackle DoS effects and limited
availability of communication channel. To derive the robust
controller gain, an emulation-based approach is adopted
from [17]. That means, the controller is designed excluding
the influence of the network, and then some conditions are
derived to deal with network constraints. In [17], Tripathy
et. al. derived the robust controller gain matrices within the
optimal control framework, which is discussed next.
B. Optimal Control Approach for Robust Controller Design
The optimal control solution for a virtual system
x(k + 1) =Ax(k) +Bu(k) + α(I −BB+)v(k), (9)
which minimizes a modified cost function
J(k) =
1
2
∞∑
k=0
{
x(k)T (Q+ F )x(k) + u(k)TR1u(k)
+ v(k)TR2v(k)
}
, (10)
is robust for the original systems (5) in the presence of
uncertainty defined in (7). Here, α is a scalar and Q ≥ 0,
R1 > 0, R2 > 0 are matrices. The system (9) has two
control inputs u and v, which are denoted as stabilizing and
virtual inputs respectively. The importance of virtual input
v is discussed in Remark 1. To design the robust controller
gains for (5), the optimal control problem for (9) and (10)
is solved adopting the method proposed in [17], [22] and
results are presented as a Lemma below.
Lemma 1: Suppose there exist a scalar  > 0 and positive
definite solution P > 0 of the following Riccati equation
AT
{
P−1 +BR−11 B
T + α2(I −BB+)R−12
(I −BB+)T}−1A− P +Q+ F = 0, (11)
and
(−1I − P ) > 0. (12)
If the optimal control inputs u = Kx and v = Lx for (9)
and (10) are selected as
K =−R−11 BT
{
P−1 +BR−11 B
T
+ α2(I −BB+)R−12 (I −BB+)T
}−1
A, (13)
L =− αR−12 (I −BB+)T
{
P−1 +BTR−11 B
+ α2(I −BB+)R−12 (I −BB+)T
}−1
A, (14)
where the gain matrices K and L satisfy the following matrix
inequality
Q1 = (Q+K
TR1K + L
TR2L+M
TP−1M)
−ATc
(
P−1 − I)−1Ac > 0, (15)
with Ac = A+BK and
M = {P−1 +BR−11 BT
+ α2(I −BB+)R−12 (I −BB+)T }−1A, (16)
then, the matrix K is the robust controller gain for (5).
The detailed proof of Lemma 1 can be found in [17]. In the
next section, the gain matrices K and L are used to derive
the transmission instant.
Remark 1: The virtual system (9) has two control inputs
u = Kx and v = Lx. The virtual input v is used for
handling the mismatched uncertainty even though v is not
used directly to stabilize the uncertain system (5). However,
v indirectly helps to design the robust controller gain K by
satisfying the inequality (15).
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we consider a class of DoS attacks
and present an event-triggering rule robustly stabilizing the
closed loop system in the presence of model uncertainty and
DoS attack. In particular, we assume that the DoS attack
holds the following assumptions.
Assumption 1: [DoS attack rate] There exist scalars
η1, c1, c2 ∈ R such that
Toff(k)
k
≤ 2 ln(η1)− ln(c1)
ln(c2)− ln(c1) , ∀ k > 1. (17)
where c1 < η1 < 1 and c2 > 1.
Assumption 2: [DoS frequency] Let Ta be the average
time between two consecutive attacks and suppose scalar η2
satisfies 1 > η2 > η1. Then, the frequency of DoS attack for
an interval [0, k) is upper bounded by
Noff(k)
k
≤ Ta, (18)
where Ta =
2(ln(η2)−ln(η1))
ln(λmax(P )/λmin(P ))
.
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply some restrictions on the nature of
the DoS attack in terms of duration and frequency of attack.
For the sake of the analysis, we limit our study to the class of
DoS signals satisfying both Assumptions 1 and 2. Owing to
the occurrence of DoS attack disrupting the communication
channel, the transmission of information at time instant ki
may be influenced.
To prove the stability of the closed-loop system (5) and
to design an event-triggering rule that can withstand model
uncertainty in the presence of DoS attacks, the following two
cases are considered. First, we establish the stability results
and derive an event-triggering condition in the absence of any
DoS attack. Second, to circumvent the DoS-related effects,
we derive some conditions that the attack signal must satisfy
for our event-triggering approach to be effective. Before
stating the main theorem, the following two lemmas adopted
from [17], [20] are introduced which are instrumental to
prove the main results.
Lemma 2: Suppose there exists a positive definite solution
P > 0 of (11) and a scalar  > 0. Then if (−1I − P ) > 0,
the following holds
XˆTPWˆ+WˆTPXˆ+WˆTPWˆ ≤ XˆT (−1I−P )−1Xˆ+−1WˆT Wˆ ,
(19)
where Xˆ and Wˆ are two matrices with appropriate dimen-
sions.
Lemma 3: Let P > 0 be a solution of (11) and the
gain matrices K and L be computed using (13) and (14),
respectively. Using (13) and (14) the following holds
AT (P−1 +BR−1BT + α2(I −BB+)R−12 (I−
BB+)T )−1A = KTR1K + LTRT2 L+M
TP−1M, (20)
where matrix M is defined in (16).
The main results of this paper are stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: Suppose there exist scalars σ ∈ (0, 1) and
 > 0 which satisfy (8) and (12) and let the controller
gain matrices derived from (13) and (14). Consider any DoS
signal for which Assumptions 1 & 2 hold. If (15) holds and
the control input (6) is actuated based on the following event-
triggering sequence
k0 = 0, ki+1 = inf
{
k ∈ N|k ≥ ki ∧ (µ‖x‖2 − ‖e‖2) ≤ 0
}
, (21)
with
µ =
σλ2min(Q1)
4‖(ATc PBK)‖2 + 2λmin(Q1)‖KTBT (P−1 − I)BK‖ ,
(22)
then, the event-triggered control law (6) ensures the ISS of
the system (5) in the presence of uncertainty (7) and DoS
attacks.
The proof of Theorem 1 is divided into two cases dis-
cussed below.
Case 1. No DoS attack has occurred: Here, we assume
that the communication medium is perfect for data
transmission, without any jamming within the channel.
Therefore, any attempts in updating the control inputs
will be successful. That means, whenever an event
is generated, the transmission of sensor and control
information are not interrupted and the control law is
actuated immediately. The stability criteria and aperi-
odic transmission rule of information in the absence of
any DoS attack are reported below for this particular
case.
Case 2. A DoS attack has occurred: Here, we suppose
that the attacker successfully compromises the effective-
ness of the communication medium, thereby preventing
feedback loops from operating from time to time. If the
channel is not available to update the control actions,
it may affect the closed-loop stability and sensing and
actuation instants. In this case, we study the effect
of attacks and model uncertainty in system’s stability
and propose a criterion guaranteeing the stability of
the closed-loop system in the presence of DoS attacks
satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2.
Proof: [Proof of Theorem 1] Case 1. Let there exists
an ISS Lyapunov function V (k) = xTPx. Using (5), ∆V =
[V (k + 1)− V (k)] is computed as
∆V = xT [ATc PAc +A
T
c P∆A+ ∆A
TPAc + ∆A
TP∆A]x
+ xTATc PBKe+ x
T∆ATPBKe+ eTKTBTPAcx
+ eTKTBTP∆Ax+ eTKTBTPBKe− xTPx,
where Ac = A+BK. The above equality is simplified using
Lemma 2 as
∆V ≤ xT [ATc (P + P (−1I − P )−1P )Ac − P
+2−1∆AT∆A]x+ xTATc PBKe
+eTKTBTPAcx+ e
TKTBT (P
+P (−1I − P )−1P )BKe. (23)
Using matrix inversion lemma and solution of Riccati equa-
tion from (11), inequality (23) is simplified as
∆V ≤ xT [ATc (P−1 − I)−1Ac − (Q+ F )−AT (P−1
+BR−1BT + α2(I −BB+)R−12 (I −BB+)T )−1A
+ 2−1∆AT∆A]x+ xTATc PBKe+ e
TKTBTPAcx
+ eTKTBT (P−1 − I)−1)BKe. (24)
Using (8) and applying Lemma 3 to (24), we arrive at
∆V ≤ xT [ATc (P−1 − I)−1Ac −Q−KTR1K − LTR2L
−MTP−1M ]x+ ψxTx+ 1
ψ
‖ATc PBK‖2‖e‖2
+ eTKTBT (P−1 − I)−1)BKe,
where ψ is a positive scalar. Furthermore, using (15), we can
simplify above inequality to
∆V ≤ −xTQ1x+ ψxTx+ 1
ψ
‖ATc PBK‖2‖e‖2
+ ‖KTBT (P−1 − I)−1)BK‖‖e‖2.
Choosing ψ = λmin(Q1)2 , the following is obtained
∆V ≤ −ξ1‖x(k)‖2 + ξ2‖e(k)‖2, (25)
where matrix Q1 is defined in (15) and ξ1 =
λmin(Q1)
2 and
ξ2 =
(
2(‖ATc PBK‖2
λmin(Q1)
+ ‖KTBT (P−1 − I)−1BK‖
)
. Using
Definitions 1 and 2, the inequality (25) ensures the ISS of
(5). In the absence of any DoS attack, the event-triggering
condition (21) is also derived using (25). In fact, the control
inputs need to be actuated whenever the condition (21) is
violated.
The Lyapunov function V (x) = xTPx satisfies (3) where
α1(‖x‖) = λmin(P )‖x‖2 and α2(‖x‖) = λmax(P )‖x‖2. Now
applying the event-triggering condition (21), the bound of
∆V can be written as
∆V (x) ≤ − ξ1
λmin(P )
(1− σ)V (x) ≤ −λmin(Q1)
2λmin(P )
(1− σ)V (x),
(26)
where σ ∈ (0, 1) regulates the transmission of information
over the network. The information exchange over the net-
work has inverse relation with the selection of σ. This proves
that the closed-loop system (5) is globally asymptotically
stable with event-triggered feedback and model uncertainty.
Using (26), following yields
V (k + 1) ≤ c1V (k) (27)
where c1 = (1− λmin(Q1)2λmin(P ) (1− σ)) and is always less than 1
as V (x) is decreasing. The following Remark describes the
growth of error e in between two consecutive events.
Remark 2: Inequality (26) signifies that the state of the
uncertain system (5) will remain bounded. Since the state is
bounded, the measurement error e(k) is also bounded. Here,
the variable e(k) evolves based on the following difference
equation
e(k + 1) = x(ki)− x(k + 1), (28)
= (A+BK + ∆A)e(k) + (I − (A+ ∆A+BK))x(ki).
The matrix ∆A is also bounded as the condition (8) holds
∀ p ∈ Ω. This proves that the error growth remains bounded
in between two consecutive events.
Case 2: Suppose that a DoS attack occurs in the feedback
channel at the instant ai ∈ [0, k), where i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}
represents the ith attack event, and this attack lasts for the
duration kai time units. The scalar m represents the number
of attacks during [0, k). Now, within this time interval kai ,
if an event is not generated then the requirement of feedback
channel is unnecessary and the measurement error will grow
according to (28). The problem is more severe if any event
occurs within kai time duration. According to (21), a trig-
gering event occurs only when the stability criterion (25) is
violated. Therefore, the unavailability of the communication
channel may destabilize the system. The effects of this DoS
attack on the system’s stability is considered and analyzed
in what follows.
Within the interval [0, k), some transmission attempts are
not successful due to jamming. In other words, for the
time duration
(
k −
m∑
i=1
kai
)
, the channel is available for
communication and for the remaining time, the channel is
unavailable due to the DoS attack. The duration
m∑
i=1
kai is
represented by Toff(k). Then, at ai, the growth of variable e
is
e(k) = x(ki(ai))− x(k), (29)
where x(ki(ai)) represents the state of the system at the last
successful control update up to ai. At the moment of the
attack, the condition (25) holds. That means
‖e(ai)‖ ≤ √µ‖x(ai)‖, x(ki(ai))− x(ai) ≤
√
µ‖x(ai)‖.
Using (29), the error e(k) can be expressed as
‖e(k)‖ ≤ (1 +√µ)‖x(ai)‖+ ‖x(k)‖. (30)
The inequalities (30) and (25) can be used to compute ∆V
as
∆V ≤ −ξ1‖x(k)‖2 + ξ2 ((1 +√µ)‖x(ai)‖+ ‖x(k)‖)2
≤ γmax{V (x(k)), V (x(ai))}, (31)
where γ = ξ2(1+µ)
2
λmin(P )
.
Let us consider the ith attack interval, i.e. (ai, ai + kai).
Using the comparison principle for discrete-time system
presented in [23, Proposition 1], for τ ∈ (ai, ai + kai), (31)
reduce to
V (x(τ)) ≤ c(τ−kai )2 V (x(ai)), (32)
where c2 = (1 + γ) > 1. Now, consider the consecutive
time interval without any DoS attack, i.e. (ai + kai , ai+1).
Again, using comparison principle, [23, Proposition 1], for
τ ∈ (ai + kai , ai+1), (27) reduces to
V (x(τ)) ≤ c(τ−[ai+1−(ai+kai )])1 V (x(ai + kai)). (33)
Therefore, whenever DoS signal blocks the communication
channel, the system dynamics follows (32) and in the absence
of DoS signal, it is governed by (33). Recalling that the
number of off to on transitions of DoS attack within the
interval [0, k) is Noff(k). With these ingredients in mind and
combining (32) and (33), we get the following bound on
V (k)
V (k) ≤ ΞNoff(k)c(k−Toff(k))1 cToff(k)2 V (x(0)) (34)
where Ξ = λmax(P )/λmin(P ). Now, using (34) and (3), we
obtain the following upper bound for the system’s state
‖x(k)‖ ≤ Ξ 1+Noff(k)2 c
(k−Toff (k))
2
1 c
Toff(k)
2
2 ‖x(0)‖. (35)
To ensure the convergence of x(k), the following two sub-
cases are considered.
Ξ = 1: For a selection of Ξ = 1, inequality (35) reduces
to
‖x(k)‖ ≤ c
(k−Toff(k))
2
1 c
Toff(k)
2
2 ‖x(0)‖.
Now assume that there exists a scalar 1 > η1 > c1 such
that
c
(k−Toff(k))
2
1 c
Toff (k)
2
2 ≤ ηk1 .
After simplification, the following is obtained
Toff(k)
k
≤ 2 ln(η1)− ln(c1)
ln(c2)− ln(c1) . (36)
Ξ > 1: For a selection of Ξ > 1, (35) reduces to
‖x(k)‖ ≤ Ξ 1+Noff(k)2 ηk1‖x(0)‖. (37)
Now, assume that there exists a scalar 1 > η2 > η1
which simplifies (37) as
Ξ
1+Noff(k)
2 ηk1 ≤ ηk2 , (38)
and thus ‖x(k)‖ ≤ ηk2 ‖x(0)‖. The inequity (38) is used
to derive the DoS frequency as
Noff(k)
k
≤ 2(ln(η2)− ln(η1))
ln(Ξ)
= Ta,
where Ta is
Ta =
2(ln(η2)− ln(η1)))
ln(Ξ)
, (39)
which is defined in Assumption 2.
From (35), if Assumptions 1 and 2 hold for the DoS attack
signal, which are computed from (39) and (36), then ‖x(k)‖
in (35) is bounded. This completes the proof.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
This section validates the proposed robust control ap-
proach in the presence of DoS attacks with uncertainty in the
system’s dynamics using a numerical example. For the sake
of numerical validation, we consider the classical networked
control system corresponding to a batch reactor system [24]
with two inputs and two outputs. To realize a stabilizing
control law, the feedback control loop is closed by means
of a wireless communication network. The control input
is designed to tackle the aperiodic availability of feedback
information in the presence of mismatched uncertainty.
We derive a discrete-time linearized model of a batch
reactor system in the form of (5) from a continuous model
with a sampling period T = 0.05. The matrices A and B
are given by
A =

0.0690 −0.0100 0.3355 −0.2835
−0.0290 −0.2145 0 0.0338
0.0530 0.2135 −0.3325 0.2945
0.0020 0.2135 0.0670 0.1050]
 ,
and
B =
[
0 0.2840 0.0568 0.0568
0 0 −0.1573 0
]T
.
The matrix ∆A is defined as ∆A = pI where variable p is
the uncertain parameter with variations in the unit interval.
To design the controller gains, the matrices Q = 4I , R1 =
I , R2 = I and variable  = 0.01 are selected. The scalar
parameter σ is chosen to be 0.1. The simulation is carried
out using MATLAB for a run time of 6 seconds with the
initial state x =
[−0.5 −0.3 0.2 −0.05]T . The matrix
F = 2I and scalars η1 = 0.3 and η2 = 0.95 are selected
such that the conditions (8), (15), (17) and (18) are satisfied.
To obtain the controller gain matrices K and L, the Riccati
equation (11) is solved leading to
K =
[−0.0710 −0.9309 −0.0356 −0.1008
1.4597 0.1990 1.0212 −0.5773
]
,
L =

−0.0092 0.0057 −0.0053 0.0092
−0.0144 0.0174 −0.0072 0.0215
0.0220 −0.0104 0.0131 −0.0193
0.0007 −0.0166 −0.0016 −0.0142
 .
Figure 2 shows the convergence of the state x in spite of
system’s uncertainty and DoS attack on the communication
channel. The attack signal is represented with the red color.
The degradation of the system’s performance following DoS
attacks is apparent in Fig. 2. Table I shows the efficacy of
the proposed control algorithm. The symbol utotal denotes
the total number of transmissions of control inputs via
the communication network. The quantities τmin and τmax
represent the minimum and maximum duration of inter-event
time respectively. The larger inter-event time, the improved
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Fig. 2. Convergence of states in the presence of DoS attacks for p = 0.5.
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF EVENT-TRIGGERED VS. PERIODIC FEEDBACK CONTROL
Control Strategy τmax(sec.) τmin(sec.) utotal
Periodic feedback control 0.05 0.05 120
Event-triggered control with DoS 0.93 0.05 37
savings in communication resources. The lower bound of
attack duration, total DoS period and frequency are computed
as Ta = 0.1 sec., Toff = 1.53 sec., Noff = 12. To generate
the DoS signal we have used these bounds.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the robust stabilization of
discrete-time mismatched uncertain systems in the presence
of DoS attack. The primary contribution of this paper is an
explicit characterization of the attack signal, namely DoS
duration and frequency under which the mismatched system
remains input-to-state stable with event-triggered feedback.
The aperiodic use of feedback information significantly
reduces the communication overhead over the transmission
network. To handle the inherent uncertainty in the system’s
model, an optimal control approach based on a robust
control technique has been considered. The proposed robust
control approach translates the robust control problem into
an optimal control one for a virtual system with a modified
cost-functional. The optimal input for the virtual system
is the robust solution for uncertain system. The proposed
robust controller also ensures the stability of closed-loop
system under a generic class of DoS attacks, for which
the attack signal satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. Beyond its
effectiveness in overcoming the damaging effects of DoS
attacks, the developed event-triggered control technique leads
to significant savings in the channel bandwidth. The proposed
control algorithm is illustrated and validated numerically
using the classical NCS batch reactor model.
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